The Assumption of Trust within the Prisoner’s Dilemma
From Wikipedia, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is described as:
Prisoner B does not exist. Prisoner B is null. Prisoner B is untrustworthy and not worthy of the pronoun we.
If Prisoner B existed, Prisoner A would reason with the pronoun we. Instead, Prisoner A is reasoning with the pronoun I, a self-interested party, and later projecting himself upon Prisoner B.
Prisoner B might as well be imaginary, conjured by Authority to live in the head of Prisoner A.
The rules prohibit Prisoner A from trusting Prisoner B. However, in understanding the rules and accepting the existence of another player who will play the game from the I rather than we perspective, Prisoner A trusts Authority.
If instead Prisoner A accepts the rules of the game and rejects Authority because it is not to be trusted, Prisoner A should also reject projecting himself upon Prisoner B and remain in a state of uncertainty.
After all, Prisoner A’s decision is dependent upon the uncertain, imagined outcome of Prisoner B. Authority is trying to persuade Prisoner A that before he select for himself either I or we, he must first think as an other separate from we.
Faced with this uncertainty and when asked by an untrustworthy Authority if Prisoner A wants to betray Prisoner B or remain silent, Prisoner A should always respond “I don’t know.”
“I don’t know.”
“I don’t know.”
“I don’t know.”
And remain silent through uncertainty.